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Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910071-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a conflict in the court of appeals exists 
because the decision in the case at bar, which focused primarily on 
the characteristics of an accused who confessed, now erroneously 
conflicts with State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991), a 
decision rendering irrelevant the defendant's personal 
characteristics. 
2. Did the court of appeals err in refusing to address 
Petitioner's state constitutional argument, where the applicable 
state constitutional provision and case authority was cited to the 
trial court and developed on appeal? 
3. Does the Utah Constitution allow this Court to adopt 
a standard clearer than the federal, "totality of the circumstances" 
test used for determining the voluntariness of a confession? 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals' decision, State v. Miller, 183 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992), is contained in Appendix 1 of this 
petition. 
JURISDICTION 
On March 24, 1992, the court of appeals issued State v. 
Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992). Petitioner Miller 
then requested and received a thirty day extension of time to file 
the petition. Utah Code Ann. sections 78-2-2(3)(a), -(5) (1992), 
confers jurisdiction upon this Court. See also Utah R. App. P. 
49(6)(D). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional and 
statutory provisions are contained in Appendix 2: 
Utah R. App. P. 46(d) 
Utah R. App. P. 48 
Utah R. App. P. 49(6)(D) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a), -(5) 
Utah Const, art. I, section 12 
Utah Const, art. I, section 14 
Or. Const, art. I, seciton 12 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
- 2 -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 7, 1991, following a bench trial before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner Mikel Shane 
Miller was convicted of burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 
(1990). The trial court had also previously denied Mr. Miller's 
motion to suppress. Motion to Suppress Hearing [hereinafter "MS"] 
at 45 (December 17, 1990). 
The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay 
restitution for the burglary conviction. (R 37). The court imposed 
the same sentence and restitution order for the theft conviction. 
(R 38). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner Miller agrees with the "Facts" section of the 
involved opinion. See State v. Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-41 
(Utah App. 1992). Supplementary facts, which were not referred to 
by the opinion, but are contained in the record, are also included 
in this petition. 
Mikel Miller did not understand the federal system and 
its interrelationship with state charges. (MS 26). Based on 
officer Chilton's representations and before any incriminating 
statements or actions materialized, Miller told the officer, "I 
don't want to put my neck on the line and go through all of this for 
- 3 -
nothing, [I don't want] to incriminate myself if there if going to 
be no end product . . . " (MS 23). Miller may have "actively 
participated" in the process, but the fact remains that absent the 
Detective's assurances, Miller would not have confessed. (MS 22-24). 
The court of appeals' opinion also included other 
relevant factual findings: 
There is no doubt in my mind [the trial court's] 
there was some indication of leniency given to the 
defendant [Mikel Miller] here. . . . 
I think that what the officer [Chilton] told Mr. 
Miller in the jail was . . . "listen, I am close to 
the prosecutor. He generally will accept my 
recommendations. If you can help us we will see 
what you can produce and I will do the best I can to 
get him to file misdemeanor charges. 
I [the court] assume [officer Chilton] also told him 
[Miller] he was facing federal charges and that that 
was in some way a coercion. . . . I find that he 
had been in jail three or four days, which is a 
substantial time, and that indicates to some extent 
there is some coercion. 
See Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 n.l. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISCOUNTED THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED WERE 
COERCIVE 
In State v. Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 
1992), the court of appeals acknowledged the following coercive 
circumstances as found by the trial court: "the threat of federal 
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charges, the promises of leniency and the length of his [Mikel 
Miller's] stay in jail prior to the interrogation were evidence of 
'impermissible' coercion." 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. These 
circumstances were not, as the court of appeals claimed, merely 
"potentially coercive 'details of the interrogation.'" Id. at 41 
(emphasis added). The trial court specifically determined that such 
circumstances were coercive. See id. (the circumstances "were 
evidence of 'impermissible' coercion"). Concluding that coercion 
existed from one or all three of the circumstances is far different 
than considering all three circumstances and then concluding that, 
overall, there was no coercion. 
The court of appeals erred by unduly emphasizing the 
characteristics particular to Mr. Miller to the exclusion of the 
already determined circumstances of police coerciveness. Even 
though a person may be "fully aware of the possible effect of a 
confession[,]" 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41, if the confession resulted 
from coercive threats, or promises, or an improper setting (or all 
of the above), the confession was still improperly obtained. Cf. 
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1990) (the accused may 
have known what he was doing, but his confession was still 
involuntary because it was given in response to a detective's 
threats to, inter alia, separate him from his daughter); Mallov v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("We have held inadmissible even a 
confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain 
circumstances, to allow a suspect to call his wife until he 
confessed"); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (being 
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fully aware of the possible effect of a confession is not a 
prerequisite to determining the voluntariness of a confession)• 
The appropriate focus should have remained on whether the 
evidence "reveal[ed] some physical or psychological force or 
manipulation that [was] designed to induce the accused to talk when 
he otherwise would not have done so." State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 
1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) (using a "totality of the circumstances" 
standard); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 ("Governments, state and federal, 
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence 
independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a 
charge against an accused out of his own mouth"). 
If a person's "intelligence" and "familiarity with the 
legal system" could in fact negate police coerciveness, the Miller 
decision could conceivably preclude a ruling of "coercion" when ever 
an "intelligent" person familiar with the legal system was 
involved. Not only would former convicts be effected, but all 
persons knowledgable in law (e.g. [former] police officers, lawyers, 
legislators) could never be coerced—regardless of the nature of the 
threats, or promises, or the coerciveness of the setting. 
Instead of emphasizing the defendant's individual 
characteristics, another panel of the court of appeals has focused 
on the "coercive tactics [of] government agents." State v. Singer, 
815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991) (attached as Appendix 3). In Singer, 
the court discounted Singer's claim "that his peculiar background 
and lack of socialization, stemming in part from home education, 
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rendered him uniquely susceptible to subtle coercion and made him 
extremely guillible." 818 P.2d at 1310. 
The essence of Singer's claim of involuntariness is 
that his free will was overcome by the agents as they 
conversed regarding their families. The United States 
Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 
(1986), eschewed a "free will" analysis of 
voluntariness of confessions. The Court stated that 
the sole concern underlying the Fifth Amendment is 
coercive tactics by government agents. Id. at 169-70. 
The Court explained: "Miranda protects defendants 
against government coercion leading them to surrender 
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no 
further than that." Id. at 170-71. 
Singerr 818 P.2d at 1310-11 (emphasis in original). 
Since the trial court below determined that Detective 
Chilton used coercive tactics, the court of appeals went too far in 
over emphasizing Miller's "will" and intellect. See Colorado v. 
Connelly- 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (it is improper to conclude "that 
a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its 
relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional 'voluntariness'"). 
The Singer opinion, which rejected Singer's claim that his 
confession was "involuntary due to his peculiar personal 
characteristics[,]" Singer, 815 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added), 
conflicts directly with the Miller opinion, which accepted the 
State's claim that Miller's confession was voluntary due to his 
personal characteristics. Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41. 
Thus, different panels of the court of appeals have applied 
inconsistent and varied analysis. On the one hand, a court of 
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appeals' panel has discounted an accused's characteristics when they 
seemed helpful to his defense. See Singer, 815 P.2d 1303. On the 
other hand, a different court of appeals' panel has emphasized the 
accused characteristics when they seemed helpful to the prosecution. 
Miller, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40. Such a double-edged sword led to a 
conflict in the required analysis for determining the voluntariness 
of a confession. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ARGUMENT 
In State v. Miller. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1992), 
the court of appeals recognized that petitioner Miller "cited the 
case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his 
Memorandum Supporting Defendant's Motion to Suppress." 183 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 42. However, the Miller court "refuse[d] to adopt such 
a broad rule that would preserve an issue for appeal by merely 
citing to a case without accompanying argument." Id. 
The language contained in Crank, though, was directly 
applicable to the promises and threats in the case at bar: 
When the state seeks to put the confession before the 
jury it must establish its competency to the court. 
To do this it must show that the confession was given 
by the accused as his voluntary act; as an expression 
of his independent and free will, uninfluenced by fear 
of punishment or by hope of reward; that it was not 
induced or influenced by any advantages or benefits 
that might accrue to him or those near or dear to him, 
nor was it given to lighten any penalties or 
punishments the law might impose on him if tried and 
convicted without confessing; and that it was not 
given as a result of a desire to escape or avoid any 
misery, threats, acts, or conduct of any other person. 
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having it in their power, or whom he believed had it 
in their power, to inflict upon him, or upon those 
whom it was his duty or privilege to protect. 
Crank, 142 P.2d at 184 (emphasis added). 
Crank also cited numerous examples, similar to the case at 
bar, in which "the language in each mentioned was held to be an 
inducement sufficient to exclude a confession or statement made in 
consequence thereof:" 
It will be better for you to make a full 
disclosure. . . . I don't think the truth will hurt 
anybody. It will be better for you to come out and 
tell all you know about it, if you feel that 
way. . . . Edmund, if you know anything, it may be 
best for you to tell it; or Edmund, if you know 
anything, go and tell it, and it may be best for 
you. . . . It will go better with you to tell where 
the money is. All I want is my money, and if you will 
tell me where it is, I will not prosecute you 
hard. . . . It will be better for you to tell the 
truth, and have no more trouble about it. . . . You 
had better tell the truth. . . . It will be better 
for you to confess. . . . it would be better to tell 
the prosecuting witness all about it, and that the 
officer thought the prosecuting witness would withdraw 
the prosecution, or make it as light as 
possible. . . . If you are guilty, I would advise you 
to make an honest confession. It might be easier for 
you. It is plain against you. . . . You had as well 
tell all about it. 
Crank, 142 P.2d at 189 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), this Court 
held, "A proper objection need not cite a case; it need only fairly 
apprise the trial judge of the essence of the objection." Id. 
at 1075. Petitioner Miller did more than "nominally allude" to the 
Utah Constitution. He cited the applicable state constitutional 
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provision and provided a case, Crank, in support of his state 
constitutional argument. The language in Crank and its reference to 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution sufficiently apprised 
the trial court of his state constitutional argument. Cf. 
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 736 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted) ("The proper sequence is to analyze 
the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a 
federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake 
either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not 
deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim 
before the court in fact is fully met by state law"); Durham, 
Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts. Utah B. J. 25, 
26 (Vol. 2, No. 9 November 1989) (Utah's appellate courts have used 
the "primacy" approach in which the state constitutional analysis is 
first considered). 
Alternatively, in the past, appellate courts have expressed 
reluctance to address state constitutional arguments when they have 
not been briefed on appeal, as opposed to not being briefed at trial: 
Because defendant provides no independent state 
constitutional analysis, we decline to reach his 
challenge to the state constitution. See, e.g., State 
v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As 
a general rule, we will not engage in state 
constitutional analysis unless an argument for 
different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions is briefed."); Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272 
(Utah App. 1990) ("Until such time as attorneys heed 
the call of the appellate courts of this state to more 
fully brief and argue the application of the state 
constitution . . . we cannot meaningfully play our 
part in the judicial labratory of autonomous state 
constitutional law development.") (citations omitted). 
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State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Mr. Miller's appeal, both the State and Petitioner 
addressed and briefed the state constitutional argument. Miller 
offered a "historical" and "sister state" analysis. See infra 
Point III. The state constitutional issue was properly before the 
court of appeals for its consideration. 
Furthermore, the "exceptional circumstances" exception 
should apply to this case. Petitioner offered a unique state 
constitutional analysis which affected his liberty interests. "The 
general rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot 
be raised on appeal is excepted to when a person's liberty is at 
stake." State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). A 
state constitutional analysis in the context of criminal appeals may 
fall under one of the few "exceptional circumstances" which have 
been actively encouraged by Utah's appellate courts: 
despite our willingness to independently interpret 
Utah's constitution in other areas of the law, the 
analysis of state constitutional issues in criminal 
appeals continues to be ignored. It is imperative 
that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state 
constitutional questions. 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). 
A different state constitutional argument for determining the 
voluntariness of a confession should be considered. 
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POINT III 
THE NEBULOUS "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST 
SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A CLEARER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD 
The State acknowledged that State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 
142 P.2d 178 (1943), "relied heavily on Bram fv. United States. 168 
U.S. 532 (1897).]" Appellee's brief at 18. Petitioner Miller's use 
of Crank as the catalyst for his Bram-like state constitutional law 
standard is supported by the uniqueness of Utah's history and by a 
"sister state" analysis. 
Petitioner's proposed standard contains guidelines 
understandable to police officers and is easily implemented in the 
trial courts. "[T]he confession . . . must not be extracted by any 
sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied 
promises, however, slight, nor by the exertion of any improper 
influence." Bram. 168 U.S. 532 cited in Mallov v. Hocran, 378 U.S. 
1, 7 (1964). Bram was decided in 1897, a time almost 
contemporaneous with the creation of Utah's 1896 constitution. 
Although the Miller opinion correctly noted that this court 
in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989), "declined to follow a 
strict per se rule[,]" the nonbinding dicta was said in the context 
of a federal analysis. A different state constitutional analysis 
was not precluded. Cf. State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 
(Idaho 1988) (citation omitted) ("Long gone are the days when state 
courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation 
and methodology when in the process of interpreting their own 
constitutions"). 
- 12 -
Utah's constitutional history "differs somewhat from the 
history and experience of her sister states . . . [and] must be 
weighed in light of Utah's unusual history and experience with the 
statehood process and with the process of drafting a fundamental 
charter of government." Flynn, Federalism and Viable State 
Government—The History of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 
311, 314 [hereinafter "History of Utah's Constitution]. 
One article offering an "analysis of the unique context in 
which Utah's constitution developed" is Martha Bradley's "Hide and 
Seek": Children on the Underground. 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133 (1983) 
(hereinafter "Hide and Seek"). See id. cited in State v. Bobo, 803 
P.2d 1268, 1272-73 n.5 (Utah App. 1990). Part of Utah's 
constitutional development was the fact that "hundreds of men went 
into hiding to avoid prosecution [for polygamy and established] a 
policy of 'passive resistance.'" Hide and Seek at 137. 
Bradley's article continued, noting the community's 
prevalent concern with inadvertant and involuntary disclosures: 
Many mothers and children also went into hiding to 
avoid being called into court to testify against their 
husbands and fathers. 
. . . 
The practice of sending women to prison for 
refusing to testify against their husbands had 
tremendous implications for their children who would 
then most likely be left without either parent. . . . 
In 1885 one plural wife, Mrs. Harris, received a 
contempt citation for refusing to answer questions 
before a grand jury about the nature of her 
relationship with her polygamous husband. As a 
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result, she spent three months in the overcrowded Utah 
penitentiary with her baby. 
Mormon communities, which had always been marked by a 
high degree of cooperation, became tightly knit 
enclaves in which strangers were suspiciously avoided. 
If strangers probed into private family living 
arrangements or situations, they were suspected of 
being involved in the crusade. Children were 
carefully taught to avoid being questioned, but when 
cornered they were told to create confusion, to 
misinform, and then to hide themselves. 
The constant pressure of performing successfully, of 
avoiding trouble themselves, and of worrying about 
their fathers7 and neighbors' safety weighed heavily 
on the young and was a constant and dreary presence in 
their lives. 
Hide and Seek at 137, 138, 141, 146-48. 
The authors of Utah's constitution, all of whom were 
familiar with the "atmosphere" then in existence, would have 
welcomed the greater protections of a Bram-like rule. Cf. 
Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence 
Under the Utah Constitution. Article I. Section 14, 17 Utah J. 
Contemp. L. 267 (1991) (at the time of the 1897 Bram decision, 
Utah's constitutional drafters included men who had practiced 
polygamy). Indeed, during the drafting of Utah's Constitution, the 
state legislators were ever so mindful of the persecution just 
endured by their people. "The majority of present state 
constitutions were drafted in . . . an era of popular mistrust and 
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hostility toward government. The people's mistrust of government is 
readily apparent on the face of many state constitutions. Utah's 
constitution, drafted in 1895, is representative of the era. . ." 
Flynn, History of Utah's Constitution at 314. 
A totality of the circumstances test would have conflicted 
with the mindset of Utah's constitutional delegates. Despite their 
recent renunciation of polygamy in exchange for statehood, 
sympathetic Utah legislators would not have tolerated 
polygamy-related confessions induced under a "totality" standard. 
If, for example, still lurking federal marshalls elicited a 
confession from Mrs. Harris (the plural wife mentioned in 
Ms. Bradley's article, see Hide and Seek at 141 n.13 and 
accompanying text), Utah's constitutional inquiry would have focused 
only on whether the marshals used "threats or promises, however 
slight," to induce the confession. Utah's legislators would not 
have wanted Mrs. Harris' prior familiarity with the justice system 
to factor into a voluntariness determination, nor should her age or 
intelligence have offset a finding of coercion. 
Regardless of how this issue was resolved under the federal 
constitution, Utah's constitution required the trial court to grant 
Mr. Miller's motion to suppress. A historical and textual state 
constitutional analysis provide appropriate justifications for 
returning to a "Brain-like" standard. 
Alternatively, a "sister state" analysis finds support in 
other jurisdictions. For example, in State v. Capwell, 669 P.2d 808 
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(Or. App. 1983), the Court held, "Article 1, section 12 prohibits 
the use of a confession which has been induced by a direct or 
implied promise." Capwell, 669 P.2d at 810.1 Though unstated in 
Capwell, its state constitutional prohibition against induced 
confessions finds some of its roots in Bram v. United States, 168 
U.S. 532 (1897). See State v. Mendacino. 603 P.2d 1376, 1381 n.6 
(Or. 1979) (citing Bram, 168 U.S. 532). The thrust of Bram was 
summarized in the decision of Malloy v. Hocran, 378 U.S. 1 (1964): 
[I]n Bram, the Court held that "[i]n criminal trials, 
in the courts of the United States, wherever a 
question arises whether a confession is incompetent 
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that 
portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that 
1
 A more moderate approach was taken by the court in 
People v. Conte, 365 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Mich. 1984). At issue there 
was whether the Michigan Constitution prohibited promises of 
leniency through the strict "Bram" rule or the "totality of the 
circumstances" test. Finding neither standard appropriate, the 
court rejected them both in favor of "the simple rule that a 
confession caused by a promise of leniency is involuntary and 
inadmissible. There must be a promise and that promise must cause 
the confession." 365 N.W.2d at 657. The analysis used there is 
particularly insightful, particularly its criticism of the "totality 
of the circumstance" test. 
The Utah Supreme Court seemed to cite Conte with approval, 
see State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989), although it was 
in dicta and no definitive position was taken. Other jurisdictions, 
while not relying specifically on Conte, have also used language 
comparable to the "Conte principle" in interpreting their own state 
constitution. See State v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302, 1305 (N.H. 
1989) ("A confession made in reliance upon a promise of 
confidentiality or a promise of immunity is involuntary and coerced 
under [New Hampshire's] Constitution"). Notwithstanding these 
decisions, Petitioner Miller reiterates how the historical 
uniqueness of Utah justifies an even broader test than those used 
under other state constitutions. In the alternative, however, 
Appellant Miller would not oppose a "Conte-like" standard for 
purposes of a state constitutional analysis. 
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no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself.'" Under this test, 
the constitutional inquiry is not whether the 
conduct of state officers in obtaining the 
confession was shocking, but whether the confession 
was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be 
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor 
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however 
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper 
influence. In other words, the person must not have 
been compelled to incriminate himself. We have held 
inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a 
whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to 
allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed. 
Malloy. 378 U.S. at 7 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Utah's Constitution should also recognize principles akin 
to those announced by Bram. Compare Note, The Compelled Confession; 
A Case Against Admissibility. 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800 (1985) 
(especially Part II's critique of the "totality of the 
circumstances" test and Part Ill's proposed standard using the Bram 
principles). Even though federal cases have not always adhered to 
the "rigid Bram rule,"2 a recent string of state cases have not only 
recognized the right to depart from federal precedent, a different 
analysis has actually been employed. See, e.g.. State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (more protective state constitutional 
interpretation of the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement); State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) (absent 
2
 But see Gunsby v. Wainwright. 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 
1979) cert, denied. 444 U.S. 946 (1979); McLallen v. Wvrick. 498 
F.Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1980); People v. Jones. 331 N.W.2d 406 (1982) 
cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1084 (1983) (Kavanagh, J.); Ashby v. State. 
354 N.E.2d 192 (1976); Fex v. State. 386 So.2d 58 (Fla. App. 1980). 
- 17 -
legislative authority, article I, section 14 prohibits suspicionless 
investigative roadblocks). 
In contrast to the unambiguous nature of the proposed state 
standard, the weighing or balancing process inherent in the federal 
"totality" standard provides insufficient guidance for courts and 
officers alike: 
While we do not think our constitution necessarily 
must be interpreted as granting exactly the same 
protection as the federal constitution, we also do 
not believe the balancing test approach is mandated 
by the Utah Constitution, nor are we convinced it 
would provide the salutary effects anticipated. 
Rather, it appears likely to lead to uncertainty on 
the part of prosecutors and defendants, . . . . We 
are troubled also by the transitory nature of the 
protection offered the individual under this 
balancing test approach: it exists only when the 
interest of the state is perceived as weak, 
disappearing when the state's interest is perceived 
as great. 
State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34, 38 (Utah 1987). The Franklin 
opinion expressed these remarks in a context different from the case 
at bar, but the Court's rationale remains applicable here. Just as 
defendant Franklin could not use the "transitory nature" of the 
balancing test to his advantage, neither should state prosecutors 
use the weighing process to overcome otherwise insurmountable 
deficiencies in the "totality" of the proof. See id.; see infra 
Point II.C; cf. State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989) 
(where the court acknowledged that factors given "weight" or 
persuasiveness vary "with each judge or juror according to his or 
her own background and prior experiences"). 
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The subjective "leeway" afforded the federal "totality" 
standard results in inconsistent decisions, particularly in a case 
like Mr. Miller's where the trial court had already determined that 
some of the circumstances were coercive. Despite its preliminary 
conclusion, the trial court then simply discounted the circumstances 
and gave more weight to Miller's intellect and background. A 
historical and "sister state" analysis supports a clearer and fairer, 
state constitutional standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession. 
REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
The court of appeals' decision in Miller created a 
conflict in opinions as to the proper analysis for determining the 
coerciveness of a confession. Petitioner requests this Court to 
determine whether (or to what extent) the accused's characteristics 
should factor into the coercive determination. 
Petitioner also seeks clarification from this Court in 
regards to whether citing a case which is developed on appeal 
sufficiently preserves a state constitutional issue, and whether a 
different, state constitutional standard should be adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Miller respectfully requests that this Court grant 
his petition for writ of certiorari on the questions presented 
herein. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Kuie 4b. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictionally out of time. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a 
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial 
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehear-
ing. 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated: 
(DA list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties. 
# (2) A table of contents with page references. (3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rales, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The 
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every sub-
sidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme 
Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed- anA 
rr\\ *t-- - — 
76-6-202 BURGLARY 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion 
of a building with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-404 THEFT-ELEMENTS 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessaiy to cany into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originate 
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry, 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
0*) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)Cb). rr~— 
Utah Const. Art. 1, section 12 reads: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right 
to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec* 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the person or thing to be seized* 
U.S. Const, Amend V reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation. 
APPENDIX 2 
cumstances. In this case, the court erroneously 
interpreted the statute, and, as a result, failed 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.3 We conc-
lude that the trial court erred in dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Plaintiff also seeks review of the trial court's 
order requiring her to disclose her telephone number 
to defendant. We decline to address that issue on 
the basis of mootness. 
2. In In re Marriage of Blitstcin, 212 111. App. 3d 
124, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (1991), the court held that 
abuse can occur even if there is no overt act of 
violence. Id. at 1361. The court stated that abuse, 
which is defined in the Illinois Domestic Violence 
Act to include harassment, can include intentional 
acts that would cause another to be worried, 
anxious, or uncomfortable. Id.; see also Johnson v. 
Miller, 157 Wis. 2d 482, 459 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Ct. 
App. 1990)(stepfather,s history of violence against 
stepdaughter coupled with his forcible entry into a 
residence occupied by stepdaughter provides adeq-
uate foundation for restraining order). 
3. The trial judge inferred that he was not denying 
plaintiff a remedy because her remedy was to file 
for divorce and obtain a restraining order. However, 
the Act specifically expands the civil and criminal 
remedies for victims of domestic violence. See Utah 
Code Ann. §30-6-7 (1989)(,rAll proceedings 
pursuant to this act are separate and independent of 
any proceedings for divorce, annulment, or separate 
maintenance and the remedies provided are in add-
ition to any other available civil or criminal reme-
dies."). In addition, restraining orders are often 
ineffective in protecting abused spouses. See Jane A. 
Marquardt and Cathie Cox, Violence Against 
Wives: Expected Effects of Utah's Spouse 
Act, 5 J. Contemp. L. 277,287-88 (1979). 
Cite as 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Mikel Shane MILLER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 910071-CA 
FILED: March 24, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Ronald S. Fujino, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and 
Rnssori. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Mikel Shane Miller appeals his conviction of 
third degree burglary and third degree theft, 
claiming the trial judge improperly admitted 
into evidence a coerced and involuntary con-
fession. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Miller was booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on July 2 or 3, 1990, following a 
parole violation unrelated to the charges inv-
plved in this appeal. On July 6, 1990, a dete-
ctive interrogated Miller about his possible 
involvement in a burglary and theft of a 
computer store. 
Prior to the interrogation, the detective 
informed Miller of the potential charges facing 
him and read Miller his Miranda rights. The 
detective promised Miller that he would make 
the best recommendation possible to the pro-
secutor and would attempt to "get [the 
charges] filed as low as he possibly could" if 
Miller cooperated. The detective also informed 
Miller that he potentially faced federal charges 
and resulting penalties. Miller then confessed 
to the crimes and was released from jail into 
the custody of the detective in order to help 
recover the stolen goods. 
Miller cooperated extensively with the det-
ective in recovering the stolen goods. He also 
cooperated with other officers in a later, suc-
cessful sting operation. Felony charges were, 
however, eventually filed against Miller. 
At trial, the State sought admission of the 
confession. Miller objected, claiming the det-
ective had not met his part of the bargain in 
getting the charges reduced to misdemeanors. 
Miller argued that promises of leniency and 
threats of federal charges coercively induced 
his confession. 
The court applied a "totality of circumsta-
nces" test in deciding whether to admit the 
testimony. It found the length of time Miller 
had spent in jail prior to the interrogation and 
the threats of possible federal charges were 
"impermissibly coercive." However, the court, 
noting Miller's familiarity with the justice 
system and various interrogation techniques, 
also found him to be intelligent, well-spoken 
and articulate. Thus, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, the court declared Miller's 
confession voluntary anH HM;*H U;«. ~—»:— — 
Following a bench trial. Miller was convi-
ted of two third degree felonies, burglary and 
icft. The trial judge commented that without 
teller's confession, he could not have found 
/filler guilty on the theft charge. 
Miller appeals, claiming the confession was 
mproperly admitted into evidence because it 
/as obtained through promises of leniency 
md threats of federal prosecution in a coer-
ive environment. Miller also claims that the 
Tifth Amendment of the Utah Constitution 
>rovides broader protection against self incr-
mination than does the totality of the circu-
nstances test of the federal constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The "ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' [of a 
:onfession] is a legal question/ Arizona v. 
Fulminante, _ U . S , 111 S. Ct 1246, 1252 
(1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104, 110, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449-50 (1985)); accord, 
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 
(Utah App. 1991), which we review indepen-
dently giving no deference to the trial court. 
Srare v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991). "It is the duty of an appellate court ... 
'to examine the entire record and make an 
independent determination of the ultimate 
issue of voluntariness.'" Srare v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 
96S.Ct. 1612, 1617(1976)). 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Miller claims promises of leniency and 
threats of federal prosecution in a coercive 
environment induced his involuntary confes-
sion. 
Miller's claim is based largely on the trial 
court's determination that the threat of 
federal charges, the promises of leniency and 
the length of his stay in jail prior to the inte-
rrogation were evidence of "impermissible" 
coercion.1 Certainly, there are cases which 
support such a conclusion. Threats of possibly 
greater charges were found to be coercive in 
State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 262-64 
(Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively told "he 
might be in jeopardy on other charges unless 
he cooperated"). Promises of leniency have 
also been found to be a coercive factor. United 
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 
(9th Cir. 1981) ("promise to seek lenient tre-
atment" is evidence of coercion). Moreover, 
confinement in jail provides a suspect setting 
for coercive interrogations. State v. Moore, 
697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). 
However, in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court declined 
to follow a strict per se rule and designated 
the totality of circumstances test as appropr-
iate for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.2 Id. at 227. The court stated, 
statement was made that any threat or 
promise, however slight, renders a confession 
involuntary and inadmissible, later cases do 
not repeat that rigid rule but follow the tota-
lity of all the circumstances test." Strain, 779 
P.2d at 227. The court then remanded Strain 
to the trial court to determine the voluntari-
ness of the confession by considering the 
"totality of all the surrounding circumsta-
nces." Id. Therefore, we continue our analysis 
to determine whether from the totality of the 
circumstances "the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation" 
support the trial court's conclusion that the 
confession was voluntary. Id. at 225 (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218, 
226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973)). 
The record reveals that defendant is an 
intelligent individual with some college educ-
ation. The trial court noted that Miller "has a 
mind that can make sudden and important 
distinctions in language." He is also very 
familiar with the legal system. He has been to 
prison twice, jailed four times, and has had 
some fifteen encounters with police. Miller's 
own recollection of the interrogation demon-
strates he was familiar with interrogation tec-
hniques and that he actively and intelligently 
participated in the interrogation: 
I told [the detective] I was aware 
where I am at that time frame with 
the system, unfortunately, and that 
I've seen the you scratch my back, 
I'll scratch yours type of play 
before, and I don't want to put my 
neck on the line and go through all 
this for nothing, to incriminate 
myself.... [I]f there is any way 
possible that I can work my way 
out of a felony, I would be more 
than willing to do that. 
In short, ' the record reveals Miller actively 
participated in the interrogation process, and 
may have actually initiated and solicited the 
promise to recommend more lenient treatment, 
and that he was fully aware of the possible 
effect of a confession. In addition, the detec-
tive did not unqualifiedly promise Miller he 
would not be charged with a felony, but only 
that he would use his best efforts to have the 
charge reduced. 
The trial judge thus correctly refused to 
suppress Miller's confession under the totality 
of the circumstances test because "the chara-
cteristics of the accused" outweigh any pote-
ntially coercive "details of the interrogation." 
Id. 
STATE CONSTITUTION 
Miller argues that the Utah Constitution 
provides broader protection against the adm-
ission of involuntary confessions than does the 
federallv adopted "totality of the circumsta-
42 183 Utah Ad\ . Rep. 40 Provo, i ) ^ 
was not presented to the trial court at the 
suppression hearing, and thereby has not been 
properly preserved for appeal. Srare v. Ande-
rson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), Also, 
Miller has failed to present any exceptional 
circumstances or demonstrate plain error, 
either of which would warrant an exception to 
this rule. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78 
(UtahApp. 1990). 
Rather, Miller argues that this issue was 
properly preserved for appeal on the ground 
that he cited the case of Srare v. Crank, 105 
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his Memor-
andum Supporting Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress.3 However, the argument that Crank 
may be read to provide broader protections in 
suppression hearings was not argued before 
the trial court, nor brought to the court's 
attention for consideration. We refuse to 
adopt such a broad rule that would preserve 
an issue for appeal by merely citing to a case 
without accompanying argument. Barring 
exceptional circumstances or plain error, a 
party must bring an issue to the attention of 
the trial court to properly preserve it for 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the totality of the circumstances, 
the trial court did not err in concluding that 
the confession was voluntary. Therefore, the 
trial court did not err in refusing to suppress 
Miller's confession. 
Affirmed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. The trial judge stated: 
There is no doubt in my mind there was 
some indication of leniency given to the 
defendant here 
1 think that what the officer told Mr. 
Miller in jail was ... 'listen, 1 am dose 
to the prosecutor. He generall> will 
accept my recommendations. If you can 
help us we will see what you can 
produce and I will do the best 1 can to 
get him to file misdemeanor charges.* 
1 assume [the officer] also told 
[Miller] he was facing federal charges 
and that that was in some way a coer-
cion.... 1 find that he had been in jail 
three or four days, which is a substantial 
time, and that indicates to some extent 
there is some coercion. 
2. The United States Supreme Court likewise rece-
ntly declined to follow a strict per se rule in Arizona 
\ . Fulminantc, _ U . S 111 S. Q . 1246, 1252 
(1991). 
3. In Crank, the Utah Supreme Court relied on 
constitutional protections might be broader than 
federal protections. 
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AMENDED OPINION* 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Defendant Jorge Figueroa-Solorio appeals 
his conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1990). 
FACTS 
On January 1, 1991, Salt Lake City Police 
Officers B.L. Smith and Louis Jones observed 
defendant cross State Street at approximately 
916 South in Salt Lake City. There is no cro-
sswalk or traffic light at that location. Acco-
rdingly, the officers decided to issue a jaywa-
lking citation to defendant, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-79 (1988) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act. 
Officers Smith and Jones approached def-
endant, who had gotten into a parked car. 
They asked defendant to get out of the car 
and then asked for identification. The defen-
dant said that he did not have any I.D., but 
wrote his name in Officer Smith's notebook 
*hen requested to do so. Officer Smith went 
to his patrol car to check his warrants book 
for any outstanding warrants for defendant's 
arrest. Having found an outstanding warrant 
r~_ *i*c _i~_*i,. _MA4.«. t ;rt .^ ;*% *KA w a r r a n t s 
APPENDIX 3 
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As the majority holds, this case must be 
remanded for additional findings. The ma-
jority's statements concerning how we 
should review those findings are therefore 
dicta. Since the standard of review is not 
an issue in this case, it need not be men-
tioned at all. If any discussion is neces-
sary, I would not depart from the long-
standing practice of Utah courts to treat 
the voluntariness of a consent to search as 
a question of fact reviewable under the 
clearly-erroneous standard. See, e.g.f 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 126-
27 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991); State v. Grow-
er, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah Ct.App.1991); 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah CtApp. 
1990). 
Because I do not agree with dicta in the 
main opinion concerning the standard of 
review, I concur only in the result. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John Timothy SINGER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No, 890081-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 17, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter, in the Third District Court, Sum-
mit County, Michael R. Murphy, J., and 
defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Orme, J., held that: (1) evidence of 
defendant's recklessness was sufficient to 
support manslaughter conviction; (2) con-
versation among federal agents regarding 
their families did not overcome defendant's 
free will, and therefore his subsequent 
statements were not the product of coer-
cive tactics and were voluntarily made; and 
(3) conversation among agents was not in 
violation of defendant's decision to remain 
silent, but rather defendant voluntarily 
abandoned his privilege against self-incrim-
ination under circumstances not amounting 
to interrogation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1159.2(3) 
On appeal challenging sufficiency of 
evidence, Court of Appeals does not find 
facts anew even if defendant presents 
some competent contradictory evidence; 
Court's scope is strictly limited to determin-
ing whether there was evidence to reason-
ably support each element of charged of-
fense. 
2. Homicide ®=>269 
When considering manslaughter 
charge, degree of defendant's perception of 
risk presents conjecture-laden inquiry, in-
volving both subjective and objective ele-
ments. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-205(1). 
3. Homicide <3=>255(1) 
In resolving question of defendant's 
subjective intent in manslaughter trial, jury 
is not limited to consideration of defen-
dant's testimony, but rather it is within 
province of properly instructed jury to con-
sider all evidence admitted at trial and then 
decide whether defendant acted recklessly. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-205(1). 
4. Homicide ®»255(1) 
Evidence of defendant's recklessness 
was sufficient to support manslaughter 
conviction for death of police officer, even 
though defendant claimed that he was not 
aware of risk to human life when he fired 
rifle at police service dogs; shots struck at 
building at a potentially lethal height for 
humans, defendant's second group of shots 
were evenly spaced with sufficient time 
between them to allow for reacquisition of 
target, and shots toward building could 
have easily reached another occupied 
house. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-103(3), 76-5-
205(1). 
5. Criminal Law <s=>1169.1(l) 
If, after excising challenged evidence, 
Court of Appeals remains convinced that 
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conviction would have followed, Court finds 
lower court's ruling that evidence was ad-
missible to be harmless error. 
6. Criminal Law <^ >525 
Adult defendant's claims that he was 
mildly retarded and functioned at juvenile 
level did not have to be addressed in deter-
mining voluntariness of defendant's confes-
sion. 
7. Criminal Law <3=>412.1(1) 
Defendant's free will was not over-
come by law enforcement agents as they 
conversed regarding their families, and 
therefore defendant's subsequent state-
ments were not the product of coercive 
tactics and were voluntarily made, even 
though defendant claimed to have been suf-
fering from "clinical depression," and al-
leged that agents used subtle form of coer-
cion to which he was particularly vulnera-
ble. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>412.1(4) 
Federal agents' conversation during 
which they "pined" for their own homes 
and families did not constitute functional 
equivalent of interrogation, and therefore 
did not violate defendant's prior decision to 
remain silent, but rather defendant volun-
tarily abandoned his privilege against self-
incrimination under circumstances not 
amounting to interrogation, even though 
bombing and siege in which defendant had 
been involved resulted from difficulties ex-
perienced by his own family. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
G. Fred Metos (argued), Yengich, Rich, 
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., C. Horton, 
II, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 




Defendant John Timothy Singer appeals 
from a conviction for manslaughter, a sec-
ond degree felony. Singer claims the evi-
dence was adequate to support a conviction 
of negligent homicide, yet insufficient to 
support a conviction for the more serious 
offense of manslaughter. Singer also al-
leges that certain statements made by him 
were obtained in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. We reject both arguments and af-
firm. 
FACTS 
Before dawn on January 16, 1988, a loud 
explosion and accompanying tremors of un-
known origin occurred in Marion, Utah, in 
rural Summit County. Later that morning, 
the custodian for a local church discovered 
that the church building had been dam-
aged. A police detective investigated and 
found a carved staff, near the sight of 
what proved to be a bomb blast. The staff 
was painted red, adorned with feathers, 
and engraved with the motto, "J.S.—JAN. 
18 1979—CHURCH—STATE—NATION 
WILL BE DESTROYED." 
The initials "J.S." represented "John 
Singer," father of the defendant and self-
styled prophet, who was killed at his ranch 
in Marion during an arrest attempt on Jan-
uary 18, 1979, the date carved into the 
staff. The family, now guided by John 
Singer's widow, Vicki Singer, and son-in-
law, Addam Swapp, still resided at the Mar-
ion ranch. Addam Swapp later admitted to 
bombing the church. State v. Swapp, 808 
P.2d 115, 116 n. 1 (Utah App.1991). Family 
members believed that destruction of the 
church house would precipitate the resur-
rection of John Singer. After the bombing, 
Addam Swapp declared the Singer ranch to 
be an independent nation, and the heavily-
armed family barricaded itself in the main 
residence of the ranch. Addam Swapp and 
Vicki Singer were indicted by a federal 
grand jury for their part in the bombing 
and warrants were issued for their arrest 
and for search of the Singer ranch. A 
thirteen-day siege by state and federal law 
enforcement officials followed. 
During the siege, Addam Swapp, his 
brother Jonathan, and the defendant fre-
STATE v. SINGER 
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quently ventured outside the home as they house. The dogs 
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attended to farm chores, such as milking 
the family goat, and monitored the move-
ments and positions of law enforcement 
officers. Each, including the wheelchair-
bound defendant,1 was heavily armed dur-
ing these brief forays. Due to the pres-
ence of a number of children in the Singer 
home, law enforcement officials hoped to 
persuade the Singers to terminate the siege 
and surrender without violence. Lights 
and loudspeakers were utilized in an at-
tempt to confuse and tire the Singers. The 
Singers responded by disabling the equip-
ment, even leaving the confines of the 
ranch to do so. The officials' attitude of 
restraint ultimately led to deployment of 
police service dogs and their handlers in 
execution of a plan calculated to arrest 
Addam Swapp without gunfire.2 
Under the cover of darkness, agents of 
the Utah State Corrections Police Service 
Dog Team and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation Hostage Rescue Team took po-
sition in a nearby structure, known as the 
Bates house, bordering the west side of the 
Singer ranch. The Swapp brothers had 
earlier been seen in the Bates house. Offi-
cials hoped that agents would be able to 
isolate and peaceably arrest the Swapps if 
they made a repeat visit to the Bates 
house. Later the plan was modified to 
direct the police service dogs to take the 
Swapp brothers to the ground as they left 
the Singer house to milk the goat. On 
January 28, 1988, Corrections Lieutenant 
Fred House and Officer Jerry Pope posi-
tioned themselves with their dogs at the 
front door of the Bates house in order to 
release and command their dogs. Lieuten-
ant House was crouched in the doorway, 
his right side slightly exposed to the Singer 
house. Other agents stood nearby to pro-
vide support for the dog handlers. 
As the Swapp brothers approached the 
goat pen, the dogs were released. A near-
ly simultaneous series of events ensued. A 
burst of shots was fired from the Singer 
l. Defendant was paralyzed four years earlier 
tree-felline accident. a g
in 
2. Officials believed that Addam Swapp was the 
family's leader and that his capture would lead 
became confused and 
failed to key on the brothers. Addam 
Swapp shouldered his weapon and took aim 
at the officers. Officers fired at Addam 
Swapp and he was wounded with a single 
gunshot to the wrist. He quickly retreated 
into the Singer house. Lieutenant House 
was struck and felled by gunshots. The 
dogs reentered the Bates house through 
the front door and a second series of shots 
rang out from the Singer house. Agents 
pulled Lieutenant House further into the 
Bates house and attempted first aid. Lieu-
tenant House did not respond and was pro-
nounced dead on arrival following evacua-
tion by helicopter to the University of Utah 
Medical Center. 
Immediately after the shooting stopped, 
Addam Swapp walked out of the Singer 
house to surrender, although family mem-
bers called to him to return. With the 
surrender of Addam Swapp, the remainder 
of the family quickly followed suit. Singer 
was taken into custody by agents of the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
and transported to detention facilities in 
Salt Lake City. 
A search of the Singer house revealed 
twenty-three firearms and over 8,000 
rounds of ammunition cached at various 
points around the house. Two .30 caliber 
rifles were located near the window of Tim-
othy Singer's bedroom. One of these rifles 
was later identified as the weapon from 
which the shots directed at the Bates house 
were fired, including the fatal shot to Lieu-
tenant House. 
Subsequent to his arrest and administra-
tion of Miranda warnings, Singer waived 
his constitutional rights to counsel and to 
remain silent, began to talk, changed his 
mind and invoked his right to remain silent, 
and then talked again. Singer was inter-
viewed and gave a statement admitting he 
was seated in his wheelchair at his bed-
room window when the Swapp brothers 
went out to milk the goat. Singer admitted 
to a prompt capitulation by other family mem-
bers. Ultimately, this belief proved to be accu-
rate. 
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to firing his rifle in the direction of the 
dogs and the Bates house, but denied firing 
at any officers, although he admitted he 
knew handlers would not be far from the 
dogs. Singer was charged with second de-
gree murder. He was tried by a jury, 
which was instructed on second degree 
murder, as well as on the lesser offenses of 
manslaughter and negligent homicide. The 
jury convicted Singer of manslaughter and 
he was sentenced to a term of one-to-fif-
teen years in the state prison, to run con-
secutively to his federal sentences.3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] An appellant challenging the suffi-
ciency of the evidence faces a difficult task. 
When reviewing whether evidence is suffi-
cient to support a jury conviction, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury convic-
tion for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983). Even if the defendant presents 
some competent contradictory evidence, we 
do not find facts anew. See State v. Hop-
kins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989). Our 
scope is strictly limited to determining 
whether there was evidence to reasonably 
support each element of the charged of-
fense, and we must "assume that the jury 
3. Defendant was convicted of the federal crimes 
of attempted second degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1114 (1988), resisting or assaulting a federal 
officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1988), and two counts 
of using a firearm during a crime of violence, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988). These charges 
also arose out of the 13-day encounter with law 
enforcement officers. Defendant was sentenced 
to 10 years in federal prison for these crimes. 
4. "Recklessness" is defined as: 
A person engages in conduct . . . [rjecklessly, 
or maliciously, with respect to the circum-
stances surrounding his conduct or the result 
of his conduct when he is aware but con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi-
believed those portions of the evidence sup-
porting the verdict." State v. Stewart, 729 
P.2d 610, 611 (Utah 1986). 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Singer asks this court to reverse his con-
viction for manslaughter, admitting, how-
ever, that the evidence would support a 
conviction for negligent homicide. Under a 
charge of manslaughter, the prosecution 
must prove one of three alternative theo-
ries of culpability. The manslaughter stat-
ute provides: 
Criminal homicide constitutes man-
slaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of an-
other; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reason-
ably believes the circumstances provide a 
legal justification or excuse for his con-
duct although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the exist-
ing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (1990).4 
Singer claims the evidence was insufficient 
to establish that he acted recklessly in 
causing the death of Lieutenant Fred 
House. He claims he was merely negligent 
and thus should only have been convicted 
of negligent homicide: "Criminal homicide 
constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes 
the death of another." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-206(1) (1990) (emphasis added).5 
able risk that the circumstances exist or will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1990). 
5. "Criminal negligence" is defined as 
A person engages in conduct . . . [w]ith crimi-
nal negligence or is criminally negligent with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his con-
duct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
a i i v r u v. S1INGEK 
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Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence prov-
ing the mental state required for man-
slaughter, as opposed to negligent homi-
cide, forms the nucleus of Singer's chal-
lenge. 
In State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 
1983), the defendant and his brother, both 
of whom were intoxicated, argued and 
fought over car keys. Dyer produced a 
rifle which discharged in the direction of 
his brother. The bullet missed his brother, 
but traveled through the wall and struck 
and killed a friend standing outside the 
room. Evidence established that, although 
the gun had been modified by a gunsmith, 
the gun could not be fired without pulling 
the trigger. Dyer was tried for man-
slaughter, but convicted of the lesser of-
fense of negligent homicide. Dyer claimed 
the evidence was insufficient to show that 
he acted with criminal negligence. Review-
ing the evidence introduced at trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court disagreed and af-
firmed Dyer's conviction. The Court stat-
ed: 
The only difference between reckless 
and criminally negligent conduct is that 
under the former, one perceives a risk 
and consciously disregards it, whereas 
under the latter, one fails to even per-
ceive the risk. The risk in both cases 
must be of such a degree that an ordi-
nary person would not disregard or fail 
to recognize it. The distinction, then, is 
merely one of the degree of perception of. 
the risk. 
Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148. Thus, the critical 
distinction to be reached between reckless-
ness and criminal negligence is the mea-
sure of perception of the risk leading to the 
victim's death. 
The distinction is not capable of precise 
definition. 
The difference between [criminal] negli-
gence and recklessness is not marked by 
a sharp analytical line. On the contrary, 
the difference generally lies in making a 
judgment as to where on a continuum of 
result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive 
it constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that an ordinary person would 
unreasonable conduct one's behavior 
passes from negligence to recklessness. 
In essence it is a matter of judging when 
conduct is no longer just gray but dark 
gray. 
Boggess v. State, 655 P.2d 654, 658 (Utah 
1982). 
[2,3] When considering a manslaughter 
charge, the degree of defendant's percep-
tion of the risk presents a conjecture-laden 
inquiry, involving both objective and sub-
jective elements. State v. Wessendorf, 777 
P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah App.), cert denied, 
781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989). The jury must 
not only determine the defendant's subjec-
tive intent, but must also decide whether 
an ordinary person who was aware of the 
risk would act in spite of the risk. Id. A 
defendant can fairly be expected to testify 
that he or she was possessed of the most 
innocuous subjective intent when he or she 
committed the unlawful act. However, in 
resolving the question of defendant's sub-
jective intent, the jury is not limited to 
consideration of the defendant's testimony. 
It is within the province of a properly in-
structed jury to consider all evidence admit-
ted at trial and then decide whether the 
defendant acted recklessly. See State v. 
Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 1986) ("it 
remains within the prerogative of the jury 
to make the determination whether the de-
fendant lacked the intent"); State v. How-
ard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (distinc-
tion between requisite intent for man-
slaughter and negligent homicide is "a 
question of fact to be decided by the jury"). 
[4] Singer claims the evidence does not 
establish that he was aware of a risk to 
human life when he fired the rifle at the 
police service dogs. He claims he had no 
reason to know of the officers' presence in 
the Bates house. Singer argues that the 
officers directing the police dogs entered 
the Bates home under the cover of dark-
ness and through a window not directly 
visible from the Singer home. He also 
points out that the Swapp brothers had 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990). 
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entered the Bates home earlier and found 
the home unoccupied during those visits. 
Singer asserts he was only shooting at 
the police service dogs running about the 
property, in the belief that they posed a 
threat to the Swapp brothers. The State 
countered this claim with evidence that 
Singer's second volley resulted in a tight 
pattern of shots centered on the door 
frame. This group of shots was fired 
while the dogs were still wandering in the 
open field between the Singer and Bates 
homes. All four shots struck at a poten-
tially lethal height.6 Perhaps even more 
significant was the timing of the shots, 
demonstrated in a videotape of the encoun-
ter shown to the jury. The first three 
shots were fired in rapid sequence, and 
were answered by officers' gunfire as Ad-
dam Swapp simultaneously prepared to fire 
upon the officers. The second group of 
shots followed in measured beats, evenly 
spaced with sufficient time between them 
to allow for reacquisition of the target. 
The jury could have reasonably inferred a 
measure of deliberation of aim from this 
evidence, and equally discredited Singer's 
claim that he was only aiming at the dogs. 
The nature of Singer's purported targets 
themselves, police service dogs, refutes his 
claim of "only" shooting at dogs. These 
dogs were not of the wandering neighbor-
hood variety—they were obviously police 
service dogs who could not reasonably be 
believed to be casually roaming indepen-
dent of a human handler. Singer saw the 
open door at the Bates house and admitted 
the dogs must have come from the house. 
Singer stated that he believed the shots 
which preceded his came from the Bates 
house, and conceded that the door through 
which the dogs were released must have 
been opened and closed by a person in the 
Bates house.7 
6. Singer argues that the level of the shots was 
affected by an errant gunsight and if Singer's 
rifle sight had been properly adjusted for the 
distance between the Bates home and his firing 
point, the level of the shots would have more 
nearly approximated the height of the dogs' 
heads, Singer's claimed targets. Testimony of 
this sort is highly speculative, and the jury could 
have reasonably rejected it. An equally specula-
tive, yet equally plausible, explanation for the 
height of the shots is that, correctly supposing 
The State introduced additional evidence 
supporting a conclusion that Singer acted 
recklessly, even if the jury stopped short of 
concluding that Singer was subjectively 
aware of the officers in the Bates house. 
Diagrams and photographs of the Singer 
ranch and surrounding properties were 
presented at trial to illustrate the sequence 
of events during the siege. Near the Bates 
property, separated by a small open patch, 
were several other homes. The Jepsen 
home bordered the Bates house on the west 
side, with the Singer property on the east. 
During the course of the thirteen-day 
standoff, and after evacuation of area resi-
dents, officers used the Jepsen house and 
were clearly visible as they moved about 
the Jepsen property. The State offered 
testimony that members of the Singer clan 
had observed law enforcement officers 
moving about the Jepsen property during 
the siege. The proximity of the Bates and 
Jepsen homes is such that any shots fired 
at or in the direction of the Bates home, 
but missing their target—including shots 
fired at wandering animals—would likely 
strike the Jepsen home. Only shots fired 
at an extreme angle to the rear of the 
Bates property would not traverse the 
plane of the Jepsen property. The jury 
could have reasonably concluded that shots 
fired even generally towards the Bates 
house were fired recklessly since they 
could easily reach the occupied Jepsen 
property. 
We confine our review of the evidence to 
determining whether the evidence was 
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defen-
dant acted recklessly in shooting his rifle 
and causing the death of Lieutenant 
House. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Assum-
ing the jury believed the evidence suggest-
the officers to be equipped with bullet-resistant 
vests, Singer aimed into the doorway at a height 
approximating the unprotected groin area. 
7. Singer argues that any statements regarding 
his awareness of the presence of officers in the 
Bates house were taken in violation of his right 
to silence. We treat this claim in the following 
section. 
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ing Singer's awareness of persons within 
his line of fire, as we must, Stewart, 729 
P.2d at 611, we do not find that the evi-
dence of recklessness was "sufficiently in-
conclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt" that Singer acted reck-
lessly. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. Questions 
of intent are strictly within the province of 
the jury and the jury was not required to 
accept that Singer was merely plinking at 
the police service dogs unaware of any risk 
to human life. Velarde, 734 P.2d at 454; 
Howard, 597 P.2d at 881. Accordingly, we 
hold the evidence of Singer's recklessness 
to be sufficient to support a conviction of 
manslaughter for the death of Lieutenant 
Fred House. 
SUPPRESSION OF CONFESSION 
[5] Singer claims the trial court erred in 
refusing to suppress certain statements 
made in the course of his conversations 
with officers transporting him from the 
Singer ranch to detention in Salt Lake 
8, We note that the only piece of incriminating 
evidence which resulted from Singer's recount-
ing of the siege as he traveled to Salt Lake City, 
and which arguably could not have been proven 
in alternate fashion, was his admission that he 
knew the police service dogs were accompanied 
by human handlers. This evidence tended to 
show recklessness in firing the rifle. Any error 
in admission of this statement was probably 
harmless. See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 
— U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 
(1991). 
We deem a trial error harmless when we 
"may confidently say, on the whole record, that 
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 555 (Utah 1987) (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct 1431, 1436, 
89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); State v. Bartley, 784 
P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App.1989). Thus, if after 
excising the challenged evidence, we remain 
convinced that a conviction would have fol-
lowed, we find the lower court's ruling to be 
harmless error. 
After arriving in Salt Lake City, Singer was 
interviewed by investigators from the Utah At-
torney General's Office. Prior to the interview, 
they readministered the Miranda admonition 
and Singer once again acknowledged that he 
understood his rights and would answer the 
investigator's questions. In the course of this 
more formal and ordered interrogation, Singer 
made statements showing his awareness of the 
officers and agents in the Bates house. It is 
possible the second confession would be admis-
City.8 He claims that his confession was 
given both involuntarily and in violation of 
the requirement to scrupulously honor his 
decision to remain silent Singer does not 
allege that the conversation during which 
he offered incriminating evidence was in-
herently coercive. Rather, he argues that 
his confession was involuntary due to his 
peculiar personal characteristics. Singer's 
claims are premised entirely on the federal 
constitution. We therefore confine our 
analysis to federal law. See State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268,1272 & n. 5 (Utah App.1990). 
A. Voluntariness of Singer's Confession 
[6] The "ultimate issue of Voluntari-
ness' [of a confession] is a legal question." 
Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S. , 111 
S.Ct 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) 
(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 
110, 106 S.Ct 445, 449-50, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 
(1985)). We review the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine the voluntariness 
of a confession.9 State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 
sible under such circumstances even if the first 
were not. See, e.g., Martin v. Wainwright, 770 
F.2d 918, 929 (11th Cir.1985), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986). 
In any event, the evidence supporting reck-
lessness was not limited to Singer's stated 
awareness of officers' presence in the Bates 
house. The jury was also shown photographs 
and diagrams demonstrating that Singer's gun-
shots would likely penetrate into areas visibly 
occupied by officers and others. The jury could 
have easily relied on this evidence to conclude 
that Singer acted recklessly. 
9. Singer argues that among the factors in our 
review we must examine the "age and intelli-
gence of the witness, the place and conditions 
under which the statement was made, the cir-
cumstances that invoked the conversation, as 
well as the nature, content, and import of the 
statement itself." State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 
83 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1938), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 
178 (1943). 
Singer also claims we must specifically weigh 
personal characteristics beyond his intelligence 
level, including his state of mind during the 
questioning, and prior experiences with police 
officers. He relies on State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 
297, 300-01 (Utah 1980). We note that the 
discussion in Hunt was focused on the capacity 
of a juvenile defendant to waive his or her 
rights. Although Singer claims to be mildly 
retarded and to function at a juvenile level, we 
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221, 225 (Utah 1989). In Miller, the United 
States Supreme Court held that confessions 
may be involuntary "when the interroga-
tion techniques were improper only be-
cause, in the particular circumstances of 
the case, the confession is unlikely to have 
been the product of a free and rational 
will." Miller, 474 U.S. at 110, 106 S.Ct. at 
449-50. See also State v. Hegelman, 717 
P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) ("Evidence suf-
ficient to support a finding that a confes-
sion is involuntary must reveal some physi-
cal or psychological force or manipulation 
that is designed to induce the accused to 
talk when he otherwise would not have 
done so."). In sum, we* scrutinize both 
"the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation." Strain, 779 
P.2d at 225 (quoting Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct 2041, 
2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). 
Shortly after his arrest, Singer was driv-
en by two agents of the federal Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to facilities 
in Salt Lake City. Singer was given a form 
stating the Miranda rights and an agent 
also recited the Miranda admonition. He 
signed the waiver section of the form, indi-
cating he understood his constitutional 
rights, including the right to remain silent, 
and agreed to speak with the agents. Af-
ter a few minutes of questioning, Singer 
stated that he did not want to discuss the 
bombing or the siege. The agents honored 
his request and ceased questioning. The 
agents then began to converse between 
themselves about the length and stress of 
the incident, expressing hopes for a speedy 
reunion with their families in distant 
states.10 Singer then interjected the state-
need not address this claim. In Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 
473 (1986), the Supreme Court rejected the "ov-
erborne will" analysis of voluntariness of a con-
fession. See discussion of Connelly, infra. 
10. Singer claims that his decision to renew co-
operation with the agents transporting him was 
motivated to some degree by a generalized ques-
tion by one of the agents to the other concern-
ing the history of the Singer clan's clashes with 
various government agencies. However, the 
record is far from clear as to any expression of 
puzzlement over the family's history. During 
cross-examination, one of the agents stated that 
ment that he was surprised the agents had 
come to Utah from other states. He com-
mented on the stress and difficulty for his 
own family, and offered a description of 
some details of the incident. Without re-
stating the Miranda admonition, the 
agents renewed their questioning. Singer 
continued to answer their questions. 
Singer claims to have been suffering, at 
the time of the incident, from "clinical de-
pression, which causes people to act"—in 
his counsel's words—"recklessly." He al-
leges that federal agents used a subtle 
form of coercion, to which he was particu-
larly vulnerable. Singer concedes that 
with another defendant, the agents' inter-
rogation and comments would not have 
produced an involuntary confession, but 
adds that his peculiar background and lack 
of socialization, stemming in part from 
home education, rendered him uniquely 
susceptible to subtle coercion and made 
him extremely gullible. Singer produced 
extensive expert psychological testimony 
regarding these claims, although much of 
the expert's testimony was effectively dis-
credited by the State's own expert. 
[7] The essence of Singer's claim of in-
voluntariness is that his free will was over-
come by the agents as they conversed re-
garding their families. The United States 
Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 
(1986), eschewed a "free will" analysis of 
voluntariness of confessions. The Court 
stated that the sole concern underlying the 
Fifth Amendment is coercive tactics by 
government agents. Id. at 169-70, 107 
S.Ct at 522-24. The Court explained: "M-
randa protects defendants against govern-
the other had used "words to [the] effect" that 
he did not understand the "background of the 
situation." The agent was unable to more pre-
cisely recall any comments on the Singer family 
history. However, the other agent, who had 
been responsible for asking the questions as his 
partner took notes of Singer's responses, denied 
making any comments regarding not under-
standing the background of the incident. 
Both agents testified that Singer acted nor-
mally during the drive. They also stated that 
Singer did not appear to be mentally handi-
capped in any way, nor did he appear to be 
particularly distressed or overwrought. 
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ment coercion leading them to surrender U.S. 291, 100 
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; 
it goes no further than that." Id. at 170-
71, 107 S.Ct at 523-24. 
Both Singer and the State vigorously ar-
gued their respective positions regarding 
Singer's peculiar degree of gullibility and 
his mental state, presenting a battery of 
testimonial mental health evidence. The 
trial court determined that Singer's state-
ments were not the product of coercive 
tactics and were voluntarily made. We 
find no error in this conclusion. However, 
our inquiry cannot rest here; we must con-
sider the closely-aligned issue of whether 
Singer effectively invoked the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and if so, wheth-
er the agents improperly disregarded his 
assertion of that right when they under-
took the conversation that led to Singer's 
talking again. 
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B. Failure to Honor Singer's 
Decision to Remain Silent 
Singer asserts that the agents' discus-
sion about the stress of being separated 
from their own families is analogous to the 
well-known "Christian burial speech" ad-
dressed in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), 
rev'd on other grounds, sub nom Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In Brewer, detectives 
transporting an accused child-murderer, 
whom they knew to be a former mental 
patient who held deep religious sentiments, 
conducted a dialogue between themselves 
concerning the indecency of the child victim 
not receiving a Christian burial. Through 
this subtle manipulation the detectives suc-
cessfully enticed the defendant to reveal 
the location of the body. The Court con-
demned the use of this interrogative tech-
nique and held it to be violative of the Sixth 
Amendment since the defendant was repre-
sented by counsel at the time of the confes-
sion. 
Despite Singer's religious beliefs and 
claimed mental limitations, we find the cir-
cumstances of the conversation between 
the two agents more closely aligned with 
the events in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1980). Innis was arrested shortly follow-
ing the robbery of a cab driver by means of 
a sawed-off shotgun. While driving the 
suspect to the police station, three officers 
conversed about the proximity of the arrest 
to a school for handicapped children. One 
officer commented that tragedy would en-
sue if a handicapped child were to find the 
loaded shotgun, which had been presum-
ably abandoned near the arrest scene and 
had not yet been located. Innis told the 
officers to turn the car around and he 
would show them where the shotgun was 
hidden. Id at 294-95,100 S.Ct. at 1686-87. 
Innis challenged the admission of the shot-
gun at trial, relying on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Brewer. 
In Innis, concerned that Miranda's pro-
scription against coercive interrogation 
might be read too narrowly, the Court took 
the opportunity to refine the definition of 
"interrogation" as envisioned in Miranda. 
The Court cited several indirect forms of 
interrogation, such as contrived lineups, re-
verse lineups, and blame-transfer tech-
niques, as discussed in Miranda, and noted 
that Miranda protections extend "not only 
to direct questioning, but also to its 'func-
tional equivalent'" Innis, 446 U.S. at 
300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. The "functional 
equivalent" of interrogation was defined as 
including "any words or actions on the part 
of the police . . . that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the sus-
pect." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90 
(emphasis added). Although the question 
of whether a statement or comment is rea-
sonably likely to evoke an incriminating 
answer is an inquiry resolved from the 
perspective of the defendant, id., it must be 
resolved in light of the officers' knowledge 
of the suspect's characteristics. See id. at 
302-03, 100 S.Ct. at 1690-91. 
The Innis Court concluded that Innis had 
not been "interrogated" prior to his indica-
tion of the location of the shotgun. The 
Court noted that the conversation included 
no direct questioning of Innis. Id. at 302, 
100 S.Ct. at 1690. Nor had Innis been 
subjected to the "functional equivalent" of 
interrogation. Unlike the profoundly reli-
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gious and mentally ill defendant in Brewer, 
there was no indication that Innis "was 
peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his 
conscience concerning the safety of handi-
capped children. Nor [was] there anything 
in the record to suggest that the police 
knew that [Innis] was unusually disori-
ented or upset at the time of his arrest." 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03,100 S.Ct at 1690. 
[8] Similar to Innis, the conversation 
between the agents transporting Singer 
was very brief, comprising only a few sen-
tences of off-hand remarks. Singer claims 
that because the bombing and siege result-
ed from difficulties experienced by his own 
family, the agents' comments about "fami-
ly" were purposefully intended to be the 
functional equivalent of interrogation. We 
disagree. The agents' comments can most 
fairly be construed in the context of two 
fatigued officers who had been working 
long shifts at all hours of the day and 
night, while separated from spouses and 
children. Even when generously viewed 
from Singer's perspective, nothing in the 
record suggests that the agents' pining for 
their own homes and families represented 
anything other than what the trial court 
concluded it was—the natural expression of 
familial sentiment. 
Singer's decision to relate the story of 
the siege from his standpoint came within a 
very few minutes of a full explanation and 
recitation of his rights, accompanied by his 
signed waiver. His change of heart fol-
lowed a brief interpersonal exchange be-
tween the two agents—not a lengthy emo-
tional discourse focused toward Singer. 
The agents honored Singer's request to 
remain silent and ceased questioning until 
Singer injected himself into the conversa-
tion and voluntarily related his tale. We 
hold that no violation of Singer's right to 
remain silent occurred, as Singer voluntar-
ily abandoned his privilege against self-
11. The State also urges us to follow the rule of 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 
L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), where the Supreme Court 
held that a second interrogation following two 
hours after the initial invocation of Miranda 
rights, and addressing a crime unrelated to that 
for which defendant was arrested, did not vio-
incrimination under circumstances not 
amounting to interrogation.11 
CONCLUSION 
Singer was properly convicted of man-
slaughter. The evidence presented was 
sufficient to demonstrate that Singer acted 
recklessly in firing the shot which killed 
Lieutenant Fred House. Singer's state-
ments to law enforcement officers were not 
obtained through coercive interrogation or 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Ac-
cordingly, Singer's conviction is affirmed. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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Defendant appealed from orders of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Scott Daniels, J., revoking probation and 
revising wording of his original sentence. 
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) defendant's 18-month probation period 
was not tolled upon violation of probation, 
and (2) rule governing corrections of cleri-
cal errors could not be applied to revise 
wording of defendant's original sentence to 
stay imposition of probation after 18-
month probationary period expired. 
late Miranda when a new set of warnings was 
administered. Because we do not find Singer's 
Miranda rights to have been violated we do not 
reach this issue. However, we note that unlike 
Mosley, Singer was given no second admonition 
after he initiated conversation with the agents. 
